Interspecies justice: agency, self-determination, and assent.
In this article, we develop and defend an account of the normative significance of nonhuman animal agency. In particular, we examine how animals' agency interests impact upon the moral permissibility of our interactions with them. First, we defend the claim that nonhuman animals sometimes have right...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 178; no. 4; pp. 1223 - 1244 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Apr2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=149286877&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 149286877 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2021 vid: 178 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 149286877 10.1007/s11098-020-01472-5 ppf: 1223 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 291KB tig: atl: Interspecies justice: agency, self-determination, and assent. aug: au: Healey, Richard Pepper, Angie affil: McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada University of Roehampton, London, UK su: Animal rights Autonomy (Psychology) Normativity (Ethics) Communication Animal welfare & ethics sug: subj: Animal rights Autonomy (Psychology) Normativity (Ethics) Communication Animal welfare & ethics keyword: Agency Assent Consent Dissent Interspecies justice Nonhuman animals Self-determination ab: In this article, we develop and defend an account of the normative significance of nonhuman animal agency. In particular, we examine how animals' agency interests impact upon the moral permissibility of our interactions with them. First, we defend the claim that nonhuman animals sometimes have rights to self-determination. However, unlike typical adult humans, nonhuman animals cannot exercise this right through the giving or withholding of consent. This combination of claims generates a puzzle about the permissibility of our interactions with nonhuman animals. If animals sometimes have rights to self-determination, but lack the capacity to consent, then when, if ever, is it permissible for us to touch them, hold them, bathe them, or confine them? In the second half of the article, we develop a solution to this puzzle. We argue that while we cannot obtain animals' consent, they can engage in authoritative communications of will through acts of "assent" and "dissent." pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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