"Do identity and distinctness facts threaten the PSR?".
One conception of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) maintains that every fact is metaphysically explained. There are different ways to challenge this version of the PSR; one type of challenge involves pinpointing a specific set of facts that resist metaphysical explanation. Certain identity a...
| Published in: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 178; no. 4; pp. 1023 - 1042 |
|---|---|
| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Published: |
Springer Nature
Apr2021
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=149286886&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 149286886 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2021 vid: 178 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 149286886 10.1007/s11098-020-01481-4 ppf: 1023 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 256KB tig: atl: "Do identity and distinctness facts threaten the PSR?". aug: au: Shumener, Erica affil: University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, USA Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Mexico City, Mexico su: Metaphysics Sufficient reason Causation (Philosophy) Theory of knowledge Logic sug: subj: Metaphysics Sufficient reason Causation (Philosophy) Theory of knowledge Logic keyword: Ground Identity Principle of Sufficient Reason ab: One conception of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) maintains that every fact is metaphysically explained. There are different ways to challenge this version of the PSR; one type of challenge involves pinpointing a specific set of facts that resist metaphysical explanation. Certain identity and distinctness facts seem to constitute such a set. For example, we can imagine a scenario in which we have two qualitatively identical spheres, Castor and Pollux. Castor is distinct from Pollux but it is unclear what could metaphysically explain this distinctness fact. In this paper, I argue that we should not treat identity and distinctness facts as metaphysically fundamental. As such, identity and distinctness facts do not challenge the PSR. We can metaphysically explain them. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|