Same as the Old Boss? Domestic Politics and the Turnover Trap.
Leadership turnover brings to office new leaders with private reputational incentives to bluff about their resolve, incentivizing both incumbents and their foreign rivals to take steps that increase the risk of war. Some leader changes, however, are more dangerous than others. The turnover trap aris...
| Publicado en: | International Studies Quarterly Vol. 65; no. 1; pp. 173 - 184 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Mar2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=149290444&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 149290444 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00208833 ISQ jtl: International Studies Quarterly issn: 00208833 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2021 vid: 65 iid: 1 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 149290444 10.1093/isq/sqaa074 ppf: 173 ppct: 11 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P db: hlh ui: 149290444 tig: atl: Same as the Old Boss? Domestic Politics and the Turnover Trap. aug: au: Wu, Cathy Xuanxuan Licht, Amanda A Wolford, Scott affil: Old Dominion University Binghamton University University of Texas at Austin su: Leadership Reputation Uncertainty Political competition Management turnover Regime change Incumbency (Public officers) sug: subj: Leadership Reputation Uncertainty Political competition Management turnover Regime change Incumbency (Public officers) ab: Leadership turnover brings to office new leaders with private reputational incentives to bluff about their resolve, incentivizing both incumbents and their foreign rivals to take steps that increase the risk of war. Some leader changes, however, are more dangerous than others. The turnover trap arises when there is sufficient uncertainty about a new leader's resolve and expectations of future interactions, and whether those factors coincide depends on how new leaders come to power and the political system in which its turnover occurs. We expect that those instances of leader change most likely to generate turnover traps entail (1) democratic incumbents unconnected to their predecessor's support coalition and (2) autocratic incumbents that inherit their predecessors' coalitions. In a sample of strategic rivals from 1918-2007, we find that the probability of dispute escalation declines over leaders' tenure, but only for the two types of turnover we identify as most dangerous. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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