The Puzzle of Militia Containment in Civil War.
In most contemporary civil wars, governments collude with non-state militias as part of their counterinsurgent strategy. However, governments also restrict the capabilities of their militia allies despite the adverse consequences this may have on their overall counterinsurgent capabilities. Why do g...
| Publicado en: | International Studies Quarterly Vol. 65; no. 1; pp. 250 - 262 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Mar2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=149290461&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 149290461 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00208833 ISQ jtl: International Studies Quarterly issn: 00208833 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2021 vid: 65 iid: 1 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 149290461 10.1093/isq/sqab001 ppf: 250 ppct: 12 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P db: hlh ui: 149290461 tig: atl: The Puzzle of Militia Containment in Civil War. aug: au: Bolte, Brandon affil: Penn State University , USA su: Civil war Militias Containment (Political science) Counterinsurgency Bargaining power sug: subj: Civil war Militias Containment (Political science) Counterinsurgency Bargaining power ab: In most contemporary civil wars, governments collude with non-state militias as part of their counterinsurgent strategy. However, governments also restrict the capabilities of their militia allies despite the adverse consequences this may have on their overall counterinsurgent capabilities. Why do governments contain their militia allies while also fighting a rebellion? I argue that variation in militia containment during a civil war is the outcome of a bargaining process over future bargaining power between security or profit-seeking militias and states with time-inconsistent preferences. Strong states and states facing weak rebellions cannot credibly commit to not suppressing their militias, and militias with sufficient capabilities to act independently cannot credibly commit to not betraying the state. States with limited political reach and those facing strong rebellions, however, must retain militia support, which opens a "window of opportunity" for militias to augment their independent capabilities and future bargaining power. Using new data on pro-government militia containment and case illustrations of the Janjaweed in Sudan and Civil Defense Patrols in Guatemala, I find evidence consistent with these claims. Future work must continue to incorporate the agency of militias when studying armed politics, since these bargaining interactions constitute a fundamental yet undertheorized characteristic of war-torn states. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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