Political Conviction and Epistemic Injustice.
Epistemic injustice occurs when we fail to appropriately respect others as epistemic agents. Philosophers building on the work of Miranda Fricker, who introduced the concept, have focused on epistemic injustices involving certain social categories, particularly race and gender. Can there be epistemi...
| Publicado en: | Philosophia Vol. 49; no. 1; pp. 197 - 217 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Mar2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=149397610&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 149397610 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00483893 1VPF jtl: Philosophia issn: 00483893 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2021 vid: 49 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 149397610 10.1007/s11406-020-00263-w ppf: 197 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 381KB tig: atl: Political Conviction and Epistemic Injustice. aug: au: Case, Spencer affil: Wuhan University School of Philosophy, 113 Old Tom Road, 83250, McCammon, Idaho, USA su: Fricker, Miranda Political conventions Gender Victims Social justice Theory of knowledge sug: subj: Fricker, Miranda Political conventions Gender Victims Social justice Theory of knowledge keyword: Campus ethics Epistemic injustice Ideological discrimination Social epistemology Testimony ab: Epistemic injustice occurs when we fail to appropriately respect others as epistemic agents. Philosophers building on the work of Miranda Fricker, who introduced the concept, have focused on epistemic injustices involving certain social categories, particularly race and gender. Can there be epistemic injustice attached to political conviction and affiliation? I argue yes: politics can be a salient social category that draws epistemic injustice. Epistemic injustices might also be intersectional, based on the overlap of politics and some other identity category like race or sex. Further, and more provocatively, I argue that political minorities in academia, in particular conservatives and libertarians, are most likely the victims of epistemic injustice on the basis of their politics. Such epistemic injustices might even be routine. Although more limited in scope and severity than other forms of epistemic injustice, political epistemic injustices in academia ought to be of special concern from a standpoint of social justice because of the academy's central role in knowledge production and dissemination. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophia is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophia holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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