Temporal Fictionalism for a Timeless World.
Current debate in the metaphysics of time ordinarily assumes that we should be realists about time. Recently, however, a number of physicists and philosophers of physics have proposed that time will play no role in a completed theory of quantum gravity. This paper defends fictionalism about temporal...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 102; no. 2; pp. 281 - 302 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Mar2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=149400023&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 149400023 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318205 PPO jtl: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research issn: 00318205 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Mar2021 vid: 102 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 149400023 10.1111/phpr.12637 ppf: 281 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 991KB tig: atl: Temporal Fictionalism for a Timeless World. aug: au: Baron, Sam Miller, Kristie Tallant, Jonathan affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Western Australia, Crawley, Australia Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham, Sydney, UK su: Fictionalism (Philosophy) Physicists Metaphysics Quantum gravity Eliminativism sug: subj: Fictionalism (Philosophy) Physicists Metaphysics Quantum gravity Eliminativism ab: Current debate in the metaphysics of time ordinarily assumes that we should be realists about time. Recently, however, a number of physicists and philosophers of physics have proposed that time will play no role in a completed theory of quantum gravity. This paper defends fictionalism about temporal thought, on the supposition that our world is timeless. We argue that, in the face of timeless physical theories, realism about temporal thought is unsustainable: some kind of anti‐realism must be adopted. We go on to provide an argument against eliminativism about temporal thought. While it doesn't follow from this argument that fictionalism about temporal thought is true, we suggest that this nonetheless shows that fictionalism should be regarded as the preferred view. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy & Phenomenological Research is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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