The Structure of Bias.
What is a bias? Standard philosophical views of both implicit and explicit bias focus this question on the representations one harbours, for example, stereotypes or implicit attitudes, rather than the ways in which those representations (or other mental states) are manipulated. I call this approach...
| Published in: | Mind (0026-4423) Vol. 129; no. 516; pp. 1193 - 1237 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Oct2020
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=149475576&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 149475576 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00264423 MND jtl: Mind (0026-4423) issn: 00264423 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2020 vid: 129 iid: 516 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 149475576 10.1093/mind/fzaa011 ppf: 1193 ppct: 44 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 384KB tig: atl: The Structure of Bias. aug: au: Johnson, Gabbrielle M affil: New York University su: Differentiation (Sociology) Discrimination (Sociology) Prejudices Representation (Philosophy) Philosophy sug: subj: Differentiation (Sociology) Discrimination (Sociology) Prejudices Representation (Philosophy) Philosophy ab: What is a bias? Standard philosophical views of both implicit and explicit bias focus this question on the representations one harbours, for example, stereotypes or implicit attitudes, rather than the ways in which those representations (or other mental states) are manipulated. I call this approach representationalism. In this paper, I argue that representationalism taken as a general theory of psychological social bias is a mistake, because it conceptualizes bias in ways that do not fully capture the phenomenon. Crucially, this view fails to capture a heretofore neglected possibility of bias, one that influences an individual's beliefs about or actions toward others, but is, nevertheless, nowhere represented in that individual's cognitive repertoire. In place of representationalism, I develop a functional account of psychological social bias which characterizes it as a mental entity that takes propositional mental states as inputs and returns propositional mental states as outputs in a way that instantiates social-kind inductions. This functional characterization leaves open which mental states and processes bridge the gap between the inputs and outputs, ultimately highlighting the diversity of candidates that can serve this role. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Mind Association. item: Mind (0026-4423) holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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