Descriptive Uncertainty and Maximizing Expected Choice-Worthiness.
A popular model of normative decision-making under uncertainty suggests choosing the option with the maximum expected moral choice-worthiness (MEC), where the choice-worthiness values from each moral theory, which are assumed commensurable, are weighted by credence and combined. This study adds desc...
| Publicado en: | Ethical Theory & Moral Practice Vol. 24; no. 1; pp. 197 - 212 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Mar2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=149498332&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 149498332 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13862820 OEY jtl: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice issn: 13862820 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2021 vid: 24 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 149498332 10.1007/s10677-020-10139-3 ppf: 197 ppct: 15 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 382KB tig: atl: Descriptive Uncertainty and Maximizing Expected Choice-Worthiness. aug: au: Kernohan, Andrew affil: Department of Philosophy, Dalhousie University, PO Box 15000, 6135 University Avenue, B3H 4R2, Halifax, NS, Canada su: Decision making Choice (Psychology) Ethics Random variables Uncertainty sug: subj: Decision making Choice (Psychology) Ethics Random variables Uncertainty keyword: Commensurability Credence Maximum expected choice-worthiness Moral theories Normative uncertainty ab: A popular model of normative decision-making under uncertainty suggests choosing the option with the maximum expected moral choice-worthiness (MEC), where the choice-worthiness values from each moral theory, which are assumed commensurable, are weighted by credence and combined. This study adds descriptive uncertainty about the non-moral facts of a situation into the model by treating choice-worthiness as a random variable. When agents face greater descriptive uncertainty, the choice-worthiness random variable will have a greater spread and a larger standard deviation. MEC, as a decision rule, is sensitive only to the expected value of the random variable and not to its standard deviation. For example, MEC is insensitive to cases where an option with a large degree of descriptive uncertainty may have a higher probability of being below some threshold of impermissibility than does an option with less dispersion, even though the latter has a higher expected choice-worthiness. When applied to the same situation, similar moral theories will have statistically correlated choice-worthiness values. This correlation affects the dispersion of the credence-weighted sum of the random variables but not its expected value. Thus, MEC is insensitive to aspects of the normative situation to which a good decision-rule should be sensitive. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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