Two Informational Theories of Memory: a case from Memory-Conjunction Errors.
The causal and simulation theories are often presented as very distinct views about declarative memory, their major difference lying on the causal condition. The causal theory states that remembering involves an accurate representation causally connected to an earlier experience (the causal conditio...
| Publicado en: | Disputatio: International Journal of Philosophy Vol. 15; no. 59; pp. 395 - 432 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Paradigm Publishing Services
Dec2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=149605395&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 149605395 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 0873626X 1CM2 jtl: Disputatio: International Journal of Philosophy issn: 0873626X maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2020 vid: 15 iid: 59 pid: 35924 pub: Paradigm Publishing Services artinfo: ui: 149605395 10.2478/disp-2020-0019 ppf: 395 ppct: 37 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 2.1MB tig: atl: Two Informational Theories of Memory: a case from Memory-Conjunction Errors. aug: au: Fraga Dantas, Danilo affil: Federal University of Santa Maria (UFSM) su: Explicit memory Episodic memory Information theory Neural stimulation Information retrieval sug: subj: Explicit memory Episodic memory Information theory Neural stimulation Information retrieval keyword: causal theory of memory information theory memory-conjunction errors simulation theory of memory ab: The causal and simulation theories are often presented as very distinct views about declarative memory, their major difference lying on the causal condition. The causal theory states that remembering involves an accurate representation causally connected to an earlier experience (the causal condition). In the simulation theory, remembering involves an accurate representation generated by a reliable memory process (no causal condition). I investigate how to construe detailed versions of these theories that correctly classify memory errors (DRM, "lost in the mall", and memory-conjunction errors) as misremembering or confabulation. Neither causalists nor simulationists have paid attention to memory-conjunction errors, which is unfortunate because both theories have problems with these cases. The source of the difficulty is the background assumption that an act of remembering has one (and only one) target. I fix these theories for those cases. The resulting versions are closely related when implemented using tools of information theory, differing only on how memory transmits information about the past. The implementation provides us with insights about the distinction between confabulatory and non-confabulatory memory, where memory-conjunction errors have a privileged position. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Disputatio: International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Paradigm Publishing Services and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Disputatio: International Journal of Philosophy holder: Paradigm Publishing Services dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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