Executive Accountability and National Security.
The protection of national security has traditionally been an exception to general norms of public accountability, based on prerogative powers. The last three decades have seen efforts to bring national security closer to the normal constitutional control mechanisms of parliament and the courts. The...
| Publicado en: | Modern Law Review Vol. 84; no. 3; pp. 553 - 581 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
May2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=149731253&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 149731253 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00267961 D8H jtl: Modern Law Review issn: 00267961 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: May2021 vid: 84 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 149731253 10.1111/1468-2230.12624 ppf: 553 ppct: 28 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 256KB tig: atl: Executive Accountability and National Security. aug: au: Woods, Lorna McNamara, Lawrence Townend, Judith su: National security Royal prerogative Executive power Justice administration Constitutional law United Kingdom sug: subj: United Kingdom National security Royal prerogative Executive power Justice administration Constitutional law ab: The protection of national security has traditionally been an exception to general norms of public accountability, based on prerogative powers. The last three decades have seen efforts to bring national security closer to the normal constitutional control mechanisms of parliament and the courts. The design of and changes to mechanisms of accountability have, however, been accepted without discussion of the often narrower purposes for which they were first established (most notably for oversight of surveillance), the extent of their departure from constitutional principles, or their impact in embedding new forms of exceptionalism in the constitutional framework. This article critically assesses these developments, prompted for example by the Law Commission's recommendations to reform official secrets laws, which adopted trusted intermediary and indirect accountability models without full consideration of historical and contemporary concerns or the exceptionalism on which they were based. Though focused on the UK, our account provides a cautionary tale for national security law reform in any modern democracy. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Modern Law Review is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Modern Law Review holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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