Asymmetry as a challenge to counterfactual accounts of non-causal explanation.
This paper examines some recent attempts that use counterfactuals to understand the asymmetry of non-causal scientific explanations. These attempts recognize that even when there is explanatory asymmetry, there may be symmetry in counterfactual dependence. Therefore, something more than mere counter...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 198; no. 4; pp. 3893 - 3919 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Apr2021
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=149905598&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 149905598 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2021 vid: 198 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 149905598 10.1007/s11229-019-02317-3 ppf: 3893 ppct: 26 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 472KB tig: atl: Asymmetry as a challenge to counterfactual accounts of non-causal explanation. aug: au: Lange, Marc affil: University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, CB#3125, 27599-3125, Chapel Hill, NC, USA su: Oxford University Press Explanation sug: subj: Oxford University Press Explanation keyword: Causation Counterfactuals Mathematics Non-causal Relativity Topology Woodward ab: This paper examines some recent attempts that use counterfactuals to understand the asymmetry of non-causal scientific explanations. These attempts recognize that even when there is explanatory asymmetry, there may be symmetry in counterfactual dependence. Therefore, something more than mere counterfactual dependence is needed to account for explanatory asymmetry. Whether that further ingredient, even if applicable to causal explanation, can fit non-causal explanation is the challenge that explanatory asymmetry poses for counterfactual accounts of non-causal explanation. This paper argues that several recent accounts (Woodward, in: Reutlinger and Saatsi (eds) Explanation beyond causation: philosophical perspectives on non-causal explanations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 117–140, 2018; Jansson and Saatsi in Br J Philos Sci, forthcoming; Jansson in J Philos 112:7–599, 2015; Saatsi and Pexton in Philos Sci 80: 613–624, 2013; French and Saatsi, in: Reutlinger and Saatsi (eds) Explanation beyond causation: philosophical perspectives on non-causal explanations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 185–205, 2018) fail to meet this challenge. The paper then sketches a more positive proposal for dealing with explanatory asymmetry in non-causal explanations. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|