Conditional Justice: Evaluating the Judicial Centralization Reform in China.
Abuse of power and corruption is prevalent in authoritarian countries. Does centralized management of courts serve to tie the hands of local bureaucrats? This article evaluates the effects of China's two waves of reform aimed to centralize the management of local courts. The authors randomly sampled...
| Published in: | Journal of Contemporary China Vol. 30; no. 129; pp. 434 - 451 |
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
| Format: | Article |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
May2021
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=149920966&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 149920966 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 10670564 LCC jtl: Journal of Contemporary China issn: 10670564 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: May2021 vid: 30 iid: 129 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 149920966 10.1080/10670564.2020.1827355 ppf: 434 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T db: hlh ui: 149920966 – @attributes: type: P db: hlh ui: 149920966 tig: atl: Conditional Justice: Evaluating the Judicial Centralization Reform in China. aug: au: Zhou, Hui Liu, Junqiang He, Jiang Cheng, Jianxin affil: University of Houston, USA Sun Yat-sen University, China Jinan University, China su: China Despotism Political corruption Actions & defenses (Law) Courts Chinese politics & government, 2002- sug: subj: Despotism Political corruption Actions & defenses (Law) Courts China Courts Chinese politics & government, 2002- ab: Abuse of power and corruption is prevalent in authoritarian countries. Does centralized management of courts serve to tie the hands of local bureaucrats? This article evaluates the effects of China's two waves of reform aimed to centralize the management of local courts. The authors randomly sampled 3,993 adjudication documents from over 70,000 administrative litigation cases. Difference-in-differences estimations demonstrate that the reform does not improve civil actors' probability of winning administrative litigations. When the police department is sued, the plaintiff's odds of winning the litigation is 84.28 percent lower. Besides, a one unit increase in the defendant's rank relative to the court decreases the plaintiff's win odds by 42.99 percent. These findings reveal a logic of conditional justice and cast doubts on the effectiveness of China's legal reform. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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