A Practice‐Focused Case for Animal Moral Agency.
Considerations of nonhuman animal moral agency typically base their reasoning and (very often negative) verdict on a capacity‐focused approach to moral agency. According to this approach, an entity is a moral agent if it has certain intrapersonal features or capacities, typically in terms of conscio...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Applied Philosophy Vol. 38; no. 2; pp. 226 - 244 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
May2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=150131100&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 150131100 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 02643758 BQ0 jtl: Journal of Applied Philosophy issn: 02643758 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: May2021 vid: 38 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 150131100 10.1111/japp.12486 ppf: 226 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 157KB tig: atl: A Practice‐Focused Case for Animal Moral Agency. aug: au: Behdadi, Dorna affil: Department of Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory of Science, University of Gothenburg, Box 200, Göteborg 40 530, , Sweden su: Animal cognition Responsibility Cardinal virtues Social perception sug: subj: Animal cognition Responsibility Cardinal virtues Social perception ab: Considerations of nonhuman animal moral agency typically base their reasoning and (very often negative) verdict on a capacity‐focused approach to moral agency. According to this approach, an entity is a moral agent if it has certain intrapersonal features or capacities, typically in terms of conscious reflection and deliberation. According to a practice‐focused notion of moral agency, however, an entity is a moral agent in virtue of being a participant of a moral responsibility practice (MRP). I argue that a practice‐focused approach to moral agency, combined with empirical evidence from research on canid social play and cognition, with support from The Function Argument, makes the notion of nonhuman animal moral agency more likely than usually indicated. However, the support is not absolute, as the practice‐focused approach itself may be put into question. I describe how this objection prompts us to critically assess any empirical, metaethical, or normative assumptions on these matters. These questions, in turn, raise a number of further questions of how we should conceive of, use, and evaluate whatever standards of moral agency we adopt. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Journal of Applied Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Journal of Applied Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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