Infinite aggregation: expanded addition.
How might we extend aggregative moral theories to compare infinite worlds? In particular, how might we extend them to compare worlds with infinite spatial volume, infinite temporal duration, and infinitely many morally valuable phenomena? When doing so, we face various impossibility results from the...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 178; no. 6; pp. 1917 - 1950 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jun2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=150258971&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 150258971 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2021 vid: 178 iid: 6 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 150258971 10.1007/s11098-020-01516-w ppf: 1917 ppct: 33 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 743KB tig: atl: Infinite aggregation: expanded addition. aug: au: Wilkinson, Hayden affil: School of Philosophy, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia su: Ethics Utilitarianism Philosophy Intergenerational equity Intergenerational relations sug: subj: Ethics Utilitarianism Philosophy Intergenerational equity Intergenerational relations keyword: Aggregation Infinite utility streams Infinite value Pareto ab: How might we extend aggregative moral theories to compare infinite worlds? In particular, how might we extend them to compare worlds with infinite spatial volume, infinite temporal duration, and infinitely many morally valuable phenomena? When doing so, we face various impossibility results from the existing literature. For instance, the view we adopt can endorse the claim that (1) worlds are made better if we increase the value in every region of space and time, or (2) that they are made better if we increase the value obtained by every person. But they cannot endorse both claims, so we must choose. In this paper I show that, if we choose the latter, our view will face serious problems such as generating incomparability in many realistic cases. Opting instead to endorse the first claim, I articulate and defend a spatiotemporal, expansionist view of infinite aggregation. Spatiotemporal views such as this do face some difficulties, but I show that these can be overcome. With modification, they can provide plausible comparisons in cases that we care about most. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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