Legal proof and statistical conjunctions.
A question, long discussed by legal scholars, has recently provoked a considerable amount of philosophical attention: 'Is it ever appropriate to base a legal verdict on statistical evidence alone?' Many philosophers who have considered this question reject legal reliance on bare statistics, even whe...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 178; no. 6; pp. 2021 - 2042 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jun2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=150258976&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 150258976 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2021 vid: 178 iid: 6 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 150258976 10.1007/s11098-020-01521-z ppf: 2021 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 288KB tig: atl: Legal proof and statistical conjunctions. aug: au: Ross, Lewis D. affil: Department of Philosophy, Logic, and Scientific Method, London School of Economics, Lakatos Building, Portugal Street, Holborn, London, UK su: Jurisprudence Statistical evidence (Law) Evidence Theory of knowledge Law sug: subj: Jurisprudence Statistical evidence (Law) Evidence Theory of knowledge Law keyword: Blue Bus problem DNA Legal epistemology Legal proof Philosophy of law Proof paradox Statistical evidence ab: A question, long discussed by legal scholars, has recently provoked a considerable amount of philosophical attention: 'Is it ever appropriate to base a legal verdict on statistical evidence alone?' Many philosophers who have considered this question reject legal reliance on bare statistics, even when the odds of error are extremely low. This paper develops a puzzle for the dominant theories concerning why we should eschew bare statistics. Namely, there seem to be compelling scenarios in which there are multiple sources of incriminating statistical evidence. As we conjoin together different types of statistical evidence, it becomes increasingly incredible to suppose that a positive verdict would be impermissible. I suggest that none of the dominant views in the literature can easily accommodate such cases, and close by offering a diagnosis of my own. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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