Demographic statistics in defensive decisions.

A popular informal argument suggests that statistics about the preponderance of criminal involvement among particular demographic groups partially justify others in making defensive mistakes against members of the group. One could worry that evidence-relative accounts of moral rights vindicate this...

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Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 198; no. 5; pp. 4833 - 4851
Autor principal: Bolinger, Renée Jorgensen
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature May2021
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Demographic statistics in defensive decisions.
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        au: Bolinger, Renée Jorgensen
        affil:
          School of Philosophy, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia
          Politics Department, Princeton University, Princeton, USA
      su:
        Conditional probability
        Statistics
        Crime statistics
        Argument
      sug:
        subj:
          Conditional probability
          Statistics
          Crime statistics
          Argument
      keyword:
        Demographic statistics
        Moral encroachment
        Racial profiling
        Risk
        Self-defense
        Social inference
        Statistical evidence
      ab: A popular informal argument suggests that statistics about the preponderance of criminal involvement among particular demographic groups partially justify others in making defensive mistakes against members of the group. One could worry that evidence-relative accounts of moral rights vindicate this argument. After constructing the strongest form of this objection, I offer several replies: (i) most demographic statistics face an unmet challenge from reference class problems, (ii) even those that meet it fail to ground non-negligible conditional probabilities, (iii) even if they did, they introduce new costs likely to cancel out any justificatory contribution of the statistic, but (iv) even if they didn't, demographic facts are the wrong sort to make a moral difference to agents' negative rights. I conclude that the popular argument should be rejected, and evidence-relative theories do not have the worrisome implication.
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    language: English
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