Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms.
We characterize when a stable and strategy-proof mechanism is guaranteed to exist in the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts. We introduce three novel conditions—observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity, and non-manipulability via contractual terms—and show that when thes...
| Published in: | Review of Economic Studies Vol. 88; no. 3; pp. 1457 - 1503 |
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| Main Authors: | , , |
| Format: | Article |
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Oxford University Press / USA
May2021
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=150465065&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 150465065 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00346527 REM jtl: Review of Economic Studies issn: 00346527 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: May2021 vid: 88 iid: 3 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 150465065 10.1093/restud/rdaa052 ppf: 1457 ppct: 46 formats: tig: atl: Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms. aug: au: Hatfield, John William Kominers, Scott Duke Westkamp, Alexander affil: McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin Harvard Business School & Department of Economics, Harvard University Department of Management, Economics, and Social Sciences , University of Cologne su: Contracts Business enterprises Suretyship & guaranty sug: subj: Contracts Business enterprises Suretyship & guaranty ab: We characterize when a stable and strategy-proof mechanism is guaranteed to exist in the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts. We introduce three novel conditions—observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity, and non-manipulability via contractual terms—and show that when these conditions are satisfied, the cumulative offer mechanism is the unique mechanism that is stable and strategy-proof (for workers). Moreover, we show that our three conditions are, in a sense, necessary: if the choice function of some firm fails any of our three conditions, we can construct unit-demand choice functions for the other firms such that no stable and strategy-proof mechanism exists. Thus, our results provide a rationale for the ubiquity of cumulative offer mechanisms in practice. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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