Are dominant platforms good for consumers?
We develop a two‐sided market model where both platforms and sellers charge buyers for access. When network effects are moderate, a dominant platform that attracts more sellers and buyers is more likely to arise. Compared to when platforms split the market equally, a dominant platform always leads t...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 59; no. 3; pp. 1364 - 1378 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jul2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=150539866&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 150539866 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jul2021 vid: 59 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 150539866 10.1111/ecin.12966 ppf: 1364 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 860KB tig: atl: Are dominant platforms good for consumers? aug: au: Ko, Chiu Yu Shen, Bo affil: Department of Decision Science and Managerial Economics, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, Hong Kong Economics and Management School, Wuhan University, Wuhan, China su: Consumer goods Network effect Consumers' surplus Consumer complaints sug: subj: Consumer goods Network effect All Other Consumer Goods Rental Consumers' surplus Consumer complaints keyword: dominant platform two‐sided markets welfare dominant platform two‐sided markets welfare ab: We develop a two‐sided market model where both platforms and sellers charge buyers for access. When network effects are moderate, a dominant platform that attracts more sellers and buyers is more likely to arise. Compared to when platforms split the market equally, a dominant platform always leads to higher consumer surplus and total welfare. Moreover, both of these measures improve as network effects increase. Our results suggest that competition authorities should be cautious regarding complaints related to dominant platforms in two‐sided markets, as they may be good for consumers. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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