Laboratory federalism with public funds sharing.
Laboratory federalism hypothesizes that decentralization fosters innovation and learning in multijurisdictional systems, conducing to good policies. We discuss this using evolutionary stability, focusing in this paper on public funds sharing. In a model of rich‐to‐poor redistribution with labor mobi...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 59; no. 3; pp. 1047 - 1066 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jul2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=150539871&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 150539871 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jul2021 vid: 59 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 150539871 10.1111/ecin.12971 ppf: 1047 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 946KB tig: atl: Laboratory federalism with public funds sharing. aug: au: Ania, Ana B. Wagener, Andreas affil: Department of Economics, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria su: Labor mobility Federal government Sharing Nash equilibrium Laboratories Instructional systems sug: subj: Labor mobility Federal government Sharing Medical Laboratories Veterinary Services Testing Laboratories Nash equilibrium Laboratories Instructional systems keyword: evolutionary stability labor mobility laboratory federalism public funds sharing redistribution evolutionary stability labor mobility laboratory federalism public funds sharing redistribution ab: Laboratory federalism hypothesizes that decentralization fosters innovation and learning in multijurisdictional systems, conducing to good policies. We discuss this using evolutionary stability, focusing in this paper on public funds sharing. In a model of rich‐to‐poor redistribution with labor mobility, where policy choices based on relative success lead to drastic welfare erosion, suitably designed sharing schemes can restore efficiency. Their necessary properties are the same as in a Nash equilibrium, showing they are a powerful corrective device for different modes of government interaction. Two drawbacks appear: reduced accuracy due to large multiplicity and a tendency to overly reward inefficiently high redistribution. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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