Reference‐dependent preferences, time inconsistency, and pay‐as‐you‐go pensions.
The classic Aaron–Samuelson result argues that pay‐as‐you‐go (PAYG) pension schemes cannot coexist with higher‐return, private, retirement‐saving schemes. The ensuing literature shows if agents voluntarily undersave for retirement due to myopia or time‐inconsistency, then a paternalistic, rationale...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 59; no. 3; pp. 1008 - 1031 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jul2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=150539872&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 150539872 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jul2021 vid: 59 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 150539872 10.1111/ecin.12972 ppf: 1008 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 1.3MB tig: atl: Reference‐dependent preferences, time inconsistency, and pay‐as‐you‐go pensions. aug: au: Andersen, Torben M. Bhattacharya, Joydeep Liu, Qing affil: Department of Economics and Business, Aarhus University, Aarhus V, Denmark Department of Economics, Iowa State University, Ames Iowa,, USA su: Pensions Retirement Myopia Time sug: subj: Pensions Retirement Trusteed pension funds Myopia Time keyword: dynamic efficiency Kőszegi–Rabin pensions reference‐dependence dynamic efficiency Kőszegi–Rabin pensions reference‐dependence ab: The classic Aaron–Samuelson result argues that pay‐as‐you‐go (PAYG) pension schemes cannot coexist with higher‐return, private, retirement‐saving schemes. The ensuing literature shows if agents voluntarily undersave for retirement due to myopia or time‐inconsistency, then a paternalistic, rationale for PAYG pensions arises only if voluntary retirement saving is fully crowded out because of a binding borrowing constraint. This paper generalizes the discussion to the reference‐dependent utility setup of Kőszegi and Rabin (2009) where undersaving happens naturally. No borrowing constraint is imposed. We show it is possible to offer a non‐paternalistic, welfare rationale for return‐dominated, PAYG pensions to coexist with private, retirement saving. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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