Optimal domestic redistribution and multinational monopoly.
Having a monopoly that is not owned domestically affects a country's income redistribution policies. Assume the government uses lump‐sum taxes to redistribute but cannot regulate the monopolist's price. In many relevant circumstances, a social planner would not equate social marginal utilities of in...
| Published in: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 59; no. 3; pp. 1031 - 1047 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Article |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jul2021
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=150539888&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 150539888 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jul2021 vid: 59 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 150539888 10.1111/ecin.12990 ppf: 1031 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 853KB tig: atl: Optimal domestic redistribution and multinational monopoly. aug: au: Hamilton, Jonathan H. Slutsky, Steven M. affil: Department of Economics, University of Florida, Gainesville Florida,, USA School of Finance and Public Administration, Hubei University of Economics, Wuhan, China su: Monopolies Income redistribution Consumer preferences sug: subj: Monopolies Income redistribution Consumer preferences keyword: endogenous timing monopoly redistribution endogenous timing monopoly redistribution ab: Having a monopoly that is not owned domestically affects a country's income redistribution policies. Assume the government uses lump‐sum taxes to redistribute but cannot regulate the monopolist's price. In many relevant circumstances, a social planner would not equate social marginal utilities of income across individuals. Thus, using aggregate welfare functions as the preferences of a single representative consumer is valid only under restrictive circumstances. The monopolist always prefers to set price before the social planner chooses transfers, while the social planner may not have a first‐mover advantage. Under endogenous timing of their decisions, the government never moves before the monopolist. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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