Gibson and Gestalt: (re)presentation, processing, and construction.
Seeking to avoid the typical binary choices between symbolic representations and no representations, or between functionally decomposable psychological processes and no psychological processes, or between direct perception of mind-independent physical properties and indirect perception of sense data...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 198; pp. 2213 - 2242 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
May2021 Supplement 9
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=150591706&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 150591706 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: May2021 Supplement 9 vid: 198 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 150591706 10.1007/s11229-019-02380-w ppf: 2213 ppct: 29 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 859KB tig: atl: Gibson and Gestalt: (re)presentation, processing, and construction. aug: au: Hatfield, Gary affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania, 19104-6304, Philadelphia, PA, USA su: Sense data Gestalt psychology Environmental psychology Information processing Senses sug: subj: Sense data Gestalt psychology Environmental psychology Information processing Senses keyword: Constructivism Ecological psychology James J. Gibson Neural models Representation ab: Seeking to avoid the typical binary choices between symbolic representations and no representations, or between functionally decomposable psychological processes and no psychological processes, or between direct perception of mind-independent physical properties and indirect perception of sense data, this article proposes that even a clear-thinking friend of Gibson can accept that perception of the environment is mediated by appearances and that such appearances are produced by functionally decomposable, rule-instantiating psychological processes. In so doing, it avoids both hyper-intellectualization of the perceptual process and the positing of sense data as immediate objects of perception. It considers notions of perceptual mediation from classical Gestalt psychology, while referencing recent phenomenological arguments showing that perception does not simply conform to mind-independent physical properties. Perception presents objects and scenes under a phenomenal aspect, in a manner suitable to be (and evaluable as) action-guiding. Finally, it examines neuroscientific decompositions of Gibsonian information pickup mechanisms, finding that such mechanisms are reasonably described as effecting processes of construction (on a not-necessarily-cognitivist conception of construction). As a separate point, such mechanisms are usefully described as including subpersonal, non-symbolic representations and processes of information integration. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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