How Speech Lost Its Voice: The Informational Turn in US Free Speech Law.

In influential strains of late twentieth-century US legal discourse on free speech, speech and language have been disconnected from sound, and speech rendered as a form of writing. The effect of this is a free speech jurisprudence in which analysis of speech is less concerned with speakers and more...

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Published in:History of Humanities Vol. 6; no. 1; pp. 179 - 198
Main Author: Petersen, Jennifer
Format: Article
Published: University of Chicago Press Spring2021
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        au: Petersen, Jennifer
        affil: Annenberg School of Communication, University of Southern California, USA
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        Freedom of speech
        Legal reasoning
        Binary codes
        Legal discourse
        District judges
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        subj:
          Freedom of speech
          Legal reasoning
          Binary codes
          Legal discourse
          District judges
      ab: In influential strains of late twentieth-century US legal discourse on free speech, speech and language have been disconnected from sound, and speech rendered as a form of writing. The effect of this is a free speech jurisprudence in which analysis of speech is less concerned with speakers and more concerned with messages. The article explores this situation by examining the legal reasoning in a 2001 case in which federal district court judges ruled that computer programs written in binary computer code (1s and 0s) were a form of "speech" covered by the First Amendment. They did so by equating speech with writing, drawing on a theorization of language in terms of information rather than as embodied social practice. The article argues that this logic follows the popularization of information theory and the rhetoric of disembodiment that grew out of this popularization in the latter half of the twentieth century.
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