Nominalism, contingency, and natural structure.
Ian Hacking's wide-ranging and penetrating analysis of science contains two well-developed lines of thought. The first emphasizes the contingent history of our inquiries into nature, focusing on the various ways in which our concepts and styles of reasoning evolve through time, how their current app...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 198; no. 6; pp. 5281 - 5297 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jun2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=150669251&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 150669251 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2021 vid: 198 iid: 6 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 150669251 10.1007/s11229-019-02401-8 ppf: 5281 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 538KB tig: atl: Nominalism, contingency, and natural structure. aug: au: Mozersky, M. Joshua affil: Department of Philosophy, Queen's University, K7L 3N6, Kingston, ON, Canada su: Nominalism Computer hacking Suspicion Concepts sug: subj: Nominalism Computer hacking Suspicion Concepts keyword: Contingency Ian Hacking Mind-independence Realism Reality Representation Science Skepticism Structure ab: Ian Hacking's wide-ranging and penetrating analysis of science contains two well-developed lines of thought. The first emphasizes the contingent history of our inquiries into nature, focusing on the various ways in which our concepts and styles of reasoning evolve through time, how their current application is constrained by the conditions under which they arose, and how they might have evolved differently. The second is the mistrust of the idea that the world contains mind-independent natural kinds, preferring nominalism to 'inherent structurism'. These two pillars of thought seem at first to be mutually reinforcing: the lack of natural structure can help make sense of scientific variability and revision, while variability and revision provide reason to suspect that natural structure is little more than idealization. In what follows, I argue that these two pillars not only fail to support each other, but in fact conflict. One of them must fall, and it is clear which. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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