Davidson on Self‐Knowledge: A Transcendental Explanation.
Davidson has attempted to offer his own solution to the problem of self‐knowledge, but there has been no consensus between his commentators on what this solution is. Many have claimed that Davidson's account stems from his remarks on disquotational specifications of self‐ascriptions of meaning and m...
| Publicado en: | Southern Journal of Philosophy Vol. 59; no. 2; pp. 153 - 185 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jun2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=150670714&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 150670714 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384283 2GW jtl: Southern Journal of Philosophy issn: 00384283 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jun2021 vid: 59 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 150670714 10.1111/sjp.12402 ppf: 153 ppct: 32 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 136KB tig: atl: Davidson on Self‐Knowledge: A Transcendental Explanation. aug: au: Hossein Khani, Ali su: Explanation Journalists Technical specifications sug: subj: Explanation Journalists Technical specifications ab: Davidson has attempted to offer his own solution to the problem of self‐knowledge, but there has been no consensus between his commentators on what this solution is. Many have claimed that Davidson's account stems from his remarks on disquotational specifications of self‐ascriptions of meaning and mental content, the account which I will call the "Disquotational Explanation." It has also been claimed that Davidson's account rather rests on his version of content externalism, which I will call the "Externalist Explanation." I will argue that not only are these explanations of self‐knowledge implausible, but Davidson himself has already rejected them. Thus, neither can be attributed to Davidson as his suggested account of self‐knowledge. I will then introduce and support what I take to be Davidson's official and independent account of self‐knowledge, that is, his "Transcendental Explanation." I will defend this view against certain potential objections and finally against the objections made by William Child. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Southern Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Southern Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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