On the Paradigmatic Conception of the Physical.
What "physical" means is sometimes clarified by appealing to paradigmatically physical objects, properties, or phenomena. This move is not entirely unmotivated. The most basic intuition behind physicalism can be identified as that we, as conscious beings, are not ontologically special: we are, ultim...
| Publicado en: | Problems / Problemos Vol. 99; pp. 80 - 87 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Vilnius University
2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=150682987&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 150682987 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13921126 3D4C jtl: Problems / Problemos issn: 13921126 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2021 vid: 99 pid: 16037 pub: Vilnius University artinfo: ui: 150682987 10.15388/Problemos.99.6 ppf: 80 ppct: 7 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 1.1MB tig: atl: On the Paradigmatic Conception of the Physical. aug: au: Kıymaz, Tufan affil: Bilkent University su: Intuition Phenomenological theory (Physics) Materialism sug: subj: Intuition Phenomenological theory (Physics) Materialism keyword: physicalism physicality fiziškumas fizikalizmas ab: What "physical" means is sometimes clarified by appealing to paradigmatically physical objects, properties, or phenomena. This move is not entirely unmotivated. The most basic intuition behind physicalism can be identified as that we, as conscious beings, are not ontologically special: we are, ultimately, like all these inanimate and unconscious things; we do not exemplify any mysterious properties that are categorically over and above all the properties that are exemplified by ordinary things like chairs or rocks or their constituents. And, according to the dualists, we are, in terms of substance or property, metaphysically different from chairs, rocks, and the like. The kind of conception of the physical that refers to paradigm cases of the physical is in line with this disagreement in intuition between the physicalist and the dualist. Trying to conceptualize the physical based on some paradigmatically physical objects or phenomena, I argue, however, is a dead-end. „Fiziškumo“ reikšmė kartais aiškinama apeliuojant į paradigminius fizinius objektus, savybes arba fenomenus. Tai nėra visiškai nepagrįsta. Pamatinė fizikalizmo intuicija gali būti tapatinama su mintimi, kad mes, sąmoningos būtybės, ontologiniu požiūriu nesame išskirtinės: iš esmės mes esame panašūs į visus tuos negyvus ir nesąmoningus daiktus; mes neturime jokių paslaptingų savybių, kurios būtų viršesnės lyginant su savybėmis, būdingomis įprastiems daiktams, tokiems kaip kėdės, uolos ar jų dalys. O pagal dualistus, medžiagiškumo ar savybių požiūriu, esama metafizinio skirtumo tarp mūsų ir kėdžių, uolų bei panašių objektų. Fiziškumo samprata, besiremianti paradigminiais fizinių objektų pavyzdžiais, sutelpa į tą intuityvų nesutarimą tarp fizikalistų ir dualistų. Aš teigiu, kad bandymas konceptualizuoti fiziškumą nurodant į paradigminius fizinius objektus ar fenomenus niekur neveda. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Problems / Problemos is the property of Vilnius University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Problems / Problemos holder: Vilnius University dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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