Why Be Random?
When does it make sense to act randomly? A persuasive argument from Bayesian decision theory legitimizes randomization essentially only in tie-breaking situations. Rational behaviour in humans, non-human animals, and artificial agents, however, often seems indeterminate, even random. Moreover, ratio...
| Publicado en: | Mind (0026-4423) Vol. 130; no. 517; pp. 111 - 140 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Jan2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=150712994&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 150712994 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00264423 MND jtl: Mind (0026-4423) issn: 00264423 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2021 vid: 130 iid: 517 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 150712994 10.1093/mind/fzz065 ppf: 111 ppct: 29 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 252KB tig: atl: Why Be Random? aug: au: Icard, Thomas affil: Stanford University su: Persuasion (Rhetoric) Argument Decision theory Human behavior Theory of knowledge sug: subj: Persuasion (Rhetoric) Argument Decision theory Human behavior Theory of knowledge ab: When does it make sense to act randomly? A persuasive argument from Bayesian decision theory legitimizes randomization essentially only in tie-breaking situations. Rational behaviour in humans, non-human animals, and artificial agents, however, often seems indeterminate, even random. Moreover, rationales for randomized acts have been offered in a number of disciplines, including game theory, experimental design, and machine learning. A common way of accommodating some of these observations is by appeal to a decision-maker's bounded computational resources. Making this suggestion both precise and compelling is surprisingly difficult. Toward this end, I propose two fundamental rationales for randomization, drawing upon diverse ideas and results from the wider theory of computation. The first unifies common intuitions in favour of randomization from the aforementioned disciplines. The second introduces a deep connection between randomization and memory: access to a randomizing device is provably helpful for an agent burdened with a finite memory. Aside from fit with ordinary intuitions about rational action, the two rationales also make sense of empirical observations in the biological world. Indeed, random behaviour emerges more or less where it should, according to the proposal. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Mind Association. item: Mind (0026-4423) holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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