A Common Subject for Ethics.
The purpose of this paper is to conceptualize and explore what I shall call the Common Subject Problem for ethics. The problem is that there seems to be no good answer to what property everyone who makes moral claims could be talking and thinking about. The Common Subject Problem is not a new proble...
| Publicado en: | Mind (0026-4423) Vol. 130; no. 517; pp. 85 - 111 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Jan2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=150713000&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 150713000 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00264423 MND jtl: Mind (0026-4423) issn: 00264423 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2021 vid: 130 iid: 517 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 150713000 10.1093/mind/fzz074 ppf: 85 ppct: 26 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 177KB tig: atl: A Common Subject for Ethics. aug: au: Schroeder, Mark affil: University of Southern California su: Metaethics Theory of knowledge Language & ethics Normativity (Ethics) Norm (Philosophy) sug: subj: Metaethics Theory of knowledge Language & ethics Normativity (Ethics) Norm (Philosophy) ab: The purpose of this paper is to conceptualize and explore what I shall call the Common Subject Problem for ethics. The problem is that there seems to be no good answer to what property everyone who makes moral claims could be talking and thinking about. The Common Subject Problem is not a new problem; on the contrary, I will argue that it is one of the central animating concerns in the history of both metaethics and normative theory. But despite its importance, the Common Subject Problem is essentially invisible on many contemporary ways of carving up the problems of metaethics and normative ethical theory. My aim, therefore, is to make progress – in part by naming the problem, but also by beginning to sketch out the contours of what gives the problem its force, by distinguishing between different paths of response to the problem and assessing some of their chief merits, and finally, by distinguishing the Common Subject Problem from another problem with which it has come to be conflated. This nearby problem is the Moral Twin Earth Problem. Whereas the Common Subject Problem is a problem about what property 'wrong' could refer to, the Moral Twin Earth Problem is a problem about how 'wrong' could refer to it. The upshot of the paper, therefore, is to rescue one of the historically significant problems in normative ethics and metaethics – a problem that is essentially about normative semantics – from the illusion that has persisted over the last twenty years that it is really, somehow, a problem about metasemantics. Once we have reclaimed this problem, we can see that it could still be a problem even if there are no distinctively metasemantic problems in metaethics at all, that it is a problem faced by a wider variety of views, and that the space of possible solutions is much wider and more interesting for normative theory, moral psychology, and moral epistemology. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Mind Association. item: Mind (0026-4423) holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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