Hospital competition and quality for non‐emergency patients in the English NHS.
We investigate the effect on the quality of three high‐volume non‐emergency treatments of a reform that relaxed restrictions on patient choice of hospital. We employ a quasi difference‐in‐difference strategy and use control functions allowing for patient selection into providers correlated with unob...
| Published in: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 52; no. 2; pp. 382 - 415 |
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| Main Authors: | , , |
| Format: | Article |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jun2021
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=150823206&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 150823206 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jun2021 vid: 52 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 150823206 10.1111/1756-2171.12373 ppf: 382 ppct: 33 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 839KB tig: atl: Hospital competition and quality for non‐emergency patients in the English NHS. aug: au: Moscelli, Giuseppe Gravelle, Hugh Siciliani, Luigi affil: Economics of Social and Health Care Research Unit, Centre for Health Economics School of Economics, University of Surrey Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York su: Great Britain. National Health Service Coronary artery bypass Public hospitals Total hip replacement Patient selection Emergency physicians sug: subj: Great Britain. National Health Service General Medical and Surgical Hospitals Coronary artery bypass Public hospitals Total hip replacement Patient selection Emergency physicians keyword: choice competition control function difference‐in‐difference hospital quality choice competition control function difference‐in‐difference hospital quality ab: We investigate the effect on the quality of three high‐volume non‐emergency treatments of a reform that relaxed restrictions on patient choice of hospital. We employ a quasi difference‐in‐difference strategy and use control functions allowing for patient selection into providers correlated with unobserved morbidity. Public hospitals facing more rivals reduced quality, increased waiting times, and reduced length of stay for hip and knee replacements. This is likely due to regulated prices implying larger losses on these treatments compared to coronary artery bypass grafts, where no effects were found. Our findings are robust to estimation methods and competition measures, allowing for private providers' entry. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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