The Identity That Doesn't Deny Difference: A Non-dualist Argument.
Brahmānanda Sarasvatī has written an elaborate comment on the following inference cited in Advaitasiddhi: attribute etc. are identical to and different from attributee etc. since they are co-referential. There he wants to prove that every significant case of attribution (such as 'x [is] y') is a cas...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Indian Philosophy Vol. 49; no. 2; pp. 257 - 290 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Apr2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=150936222&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 150936222 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00221791 OI3 jtl: Journal of Indian Philosophy issn: 00221791 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2021 vid: 49 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 150936222 10.1007/s10781-021-09467-0 ppf: 257 ppct: 33 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 520KB tig: atl: The Identity That Doesn't Deny Difference: A Non-dualist Argument. aug: au: Guha, Nirmalya affil: Deparment of Humanistic Studies, Indian Institute of Technology (BHU), Varanasi, India su: Sankara, ca. 700-750 Hindu philosophy Mādhvas Kriya yoga Hindu sects sug: subj: Sankara, ca. 700-750 Hindu philosophy Mādhvas Kriya yoga Hindu sects keyword: Brahmānanda Sarasvatī difference equality identity tādātmya ab: Brahmānanda Sarasvatī has written an elaborate comment on the following inference cited in Advaitasiddhi: attribute etc. are identical to and different from attributee etc. since they are co-referential. There he wants to prove that every significant case of attribution (such as 'x [is] y') is a case of identity that coexists with a difference between two demarcators (upalakṣaṇa). The identity that coexists with difference is called 'equality' (tādātmya). This paper will argue that in each case of equality, the realist ontology chooses either identity over difference or the reverse. In the case of 'the black pot', the realist ontology prefers difference over identity. In the case of 'the qualified object is the mere object', the same ontology prefers identity over difference. Accordingly the ontological 'entity' gets projected. This is perhaps because the realist ontology is guided by Ockham's razor and the grammatical classification of objects. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Journal of Indian Philosophy is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Journal of Indian Philosophy holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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