How to Resolve Comte's Challenge: The Answer of Cognitive Neuroscience and the Neo-Aristotelian Alternative.
Comte argued against the Cartesian conception of the mind that the thinker cannot simultaneously think or perceive and observe itself so doing. Based on insights from cognitive neuroscience, Dehaene has recently given a contemporary answer to Comte's challenge. He has extended some ideas of Helmholt...
| Publicado en: | Philosophia Vol. 49; no. 3; pp. 1201 - 1218 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jul2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=151001477&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 151001477 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00483893 1VPF jtl: Philosophia issn: 00483893 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2021 vid: 49 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 151001477 10.1007/s11406-020-00291-6 ppf: 1201 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 379KB tig: atl: How to Resolve Comte's Challenge: The Answer of Cognitive Neuroscience and the Neo-Aristotelian Alternative. aug: au: Smit, Harry affil: Department of Cognitive Neuroscience, Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200, Maastricht, MD, The Netherlands su: Blindsight (Visual perception) Cognitive neuroscience Sensory perception Senses Comte, Auguste, 1798-1857 sug: subj: Blindsight (Visual perception) Cognitive neuroscience Sensory perception Senses Comte, Auguste, 1798-1857 keyword: Blindsight Comte's challenge Conceptual resolution Perception Sensation ab: Comte argued against the Cartesian conception of the mind that the thinker cannot simultaneously think or perceive and observe itself so doing. Based on insights from cognitive neuroscience, Dehaene has recently given a contemporary answer to Comte's challenge. He has extended some ideas of Helmholtz on unconscious inferences and argued that we can resolve Comte's problem by reformulating it in terms of the brain. Since the brain consists of different parts having different functions, it is possible that some parts are involved in observing (they unconsciously process information) while other parts integrate the received information resulting in conscious experiences to which we have access. Dehaene's answer is criticized and the alternative neo-Aristotelian resolution of Comte's challenge is discussed. Explanations of blindsight are used to illustrate the differences between the two responses to Comte's challenge. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophia is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophia holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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