Reliabilism's Memory Loss.
Generativism about memory justification is the view that memory can generate epistemic justification. Generativism is gaining popularity, but process reliabilists tend to resist it. Process reliabilism explains the justification of beliefs by way of the reliability of the processes they result from....
| Published in: | Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 71; no. 3; pp. 565 - 586 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Jul2021
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=151011730&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 151011730 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318094 PHQ jtl: Philosophical Quarterly issn: 00318094 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2021 vid: 71 iid: 3 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 151011730 10.1093/pq/pqaa057 ppf: 565 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 213KB tig: atl: Reliabilism's Memory Loss. aug: au: Frise, Matthew affil: Santa Clara University , USA su: Memory Reliabilism (Theory of knowledge) Epistemic logic Justification (Theory of knowledge) Theory of knowledge sug: subj: Memory Reliabilism (Theory of knowledge) Epistemic logic Justification (Theory of knowledge) Theory of knowledge keyword: generativism memory reconstructive recollection reliabilism ab: Generativism about memory justification is the view that memory can generate epistemic justification. Generativism is gaining popularity, but process reliabilists tend to resist it. Process reliabilism explains the justification of beliefs by way of the reliability of the processes they result from. Some advocates of reliabilism deny various forms of generativism. Other reliabilists reject or remain neutral about only the more extreme forms. I argue that an extreme form of generativism follows from reliabilism. This result weakens a long-standing argument for reliabilism. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St. Andrews. item: Philosophical Quarterly holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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