Kinds behaving badly: intentional action and interactive kinds.
This paper investigates interactive kinds, a class of kinds suggested by Ian Hacking for which classification generates a feedback loop between the classifiers and what is classified, and argues that human interactive kinds should be distinguished from non-human ones. First, I challenge the claim th...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 198; pp. 2927 - 2957 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jun2021 Supplement 12
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=151025614&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 151025614 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2021 Supplement 12 vid: 198 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 151025614 10.1007/s11229-018-1870-0 ppf: 2927 ppct: 30 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 607KB tig: atl: Kinds behaving badly: intentional action and interactive kinds. aug: au: Allen, Sophie R. affil: School of Politics, Philosophy, International Relations and Environment, Keele University, Chancellor's Building, ST5 5BG, Keele, UK su: Human behavior Computer hacking Metaphysics sug: subj: Human behavior Computer hacking Metaphysics keyword: Homeostatic property clusters Intentional action Interactive kinds Natural kinds Psychiatric kinds Social ontology ab: This paper investigates interactive kinds, a class of kinds suggested by Ian Hacking for which classification generates a feedback loop between the classifiers and what is classified, and argues that human interactive kinds should be distinguished from non-human ones. First, I challenge the claim that there is nothing ontologically special about interactive kinds in virtue of their members being classified as such. To do so, I reject Cooper's counterexample to Hacking's thesis that kind descriptions are necessary for intentional action, arguing that classification (although not necessarily linguistic description) is required for intentional action. Having considered ways to characterise the metaphysics of interactive kinds and the semantics of kind terms, I argue that the fact that classification facilitates intentional action makes human interactive kinds ontologically distinctive because of the anomalous nature of the change which the kind-classification brings about. I then briefly examine further distinguishing features of human interactive kinds. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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