Constitutive elements in science beyond physics: the case of the Hardy–Weinberg principle.
In this paper, I present a new framework supporting the claim that some elements in science play a constitutive function, with the aim of overcoming some limitations of Friedman's (Dynamics of reason, Csli Publications, Stanford, 2001) account. More precisely, I focus on what I consider to be the gr...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 198; pp. 3437 - 3462 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jun2021 Supplement 14
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=151025626&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 151025626 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2021 Supplement 14 vid: 198 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 151025626 10.1007/s11229-018-1833-5 ppf: 3437 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 636KB tig: atl: Constitutive elements in science beyond physics: the case of the Hardy–Weinberg principle. aug: au: Luchetti, Michele affil: Department of Philosophy, Central European University, Nador utca 13, 1051, Budapest, Hungary su: Mechanics (Physics) Population genetics Physics Evolutionary theories sug: subj: Mechanics (Physics) Population genetics Physics Evolutionary theories keyword: Constitutive principles in science Equilibrium state Hardy–Weinberg principle Michael Friedman Scientific theorising ab: In this paper, I present a new framework supporting the claim that some elements in science play a constitutive function, with the aim of overcoming some limitations of Friedman's (Dynamics of reason, Csli Publications, Stanford, 2001) account. More precisely, I focus on what I consider to be the gradualism implicit in Friedman's interpretation of the constitutive a priori, that is, the fact that it seems to allow for degrees of 'constitutivity'. I tease out such gradualism by showing that the constitutive character Friedman aims to track can be captured by three features—namely, quasi-axiomaticity (QA), generative potential (GP), and empirical shielding (ES)—which are exhibited to a maximal degree by the examples Friedman deploys, particularly in his analysis of Newtonian mechanics. I argue that not all varieties of 'constitutivity' can be captured by the kind of gradualism implicit in Friedman's view, although developing the gradualism itself might provide useful insights. To show this, I analyse the function of the Hardy–Weinberg principle (HWP) in population genetics in terms of its QA, GP, and ES. Whereas the HWP does not count as constitutive in classical philosophical interpretations (Sober in The nature of selection: Evolutionary theory in philosophical focus, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1984), nor does it within Friedman's framework, it does nonetheless perform a minimally constitutive function. By means of historical details and considerations on the prospects of replacing the HWP, I show that the HWP is minimally constitutive by being a counterfactual instantiation of a paradigmatically constitutive stability principle, where the latter might itself be regarded as an enabling condition for a variety of modelling practices across the sciences. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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