The Pragmatic Intelligence of Habits.
Habitual actions unfold without conscious deliberation or reflection, and yet often seem to be intelligently adjusted to situational intricacies. A question arises, then, as to how it is that habitual actions can exhibit this form of intelligence, while falling outside the domain of paradigmatically...
| Publicado en: | Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy Vol. 40; no. 3; pp. 597 - 609 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Jul2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=151125936&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 151125936 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01677411 NM2 jtl: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy issn: 01677411 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2021 vid: 40 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 151125936 10.1007/s11245-020-09735-w ppf: 597 ppct: 12 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 630KB tig: atl: The Pragmatic Intelligence of Habits. aug: au: Miyahara, Katsunori Robertson, Ian affil: Center for Human Nature, Artificial Intelligence, and Neuroscience (CHAIN), Hokkaido University, Kita 12 Nishi 7, Kita-ku, 060-0812, Sapporo, Hokkaido, Japan School of Liberal Arts, University of Wollongong, UOW Building 19, Northfields Avenue, 2522, Wollongong, NSW, Australia su: Dewey, John, 1859-1952 Form perception Habit sug: subj: Dewey, John, 1859-1952 Form perception Habit keyword: Dewey Dreyfus Habits Intellectualism Pragmatism Ryle ab: Habitual actions unfold without conscious deliberation or reflection, and yet often seem to be intelligently adjusted to situational intricacies. A question arises, then, as to how it is that habitual actions can exhibit this form of intelligence, while falling outside the domain of paradigmatically intentional actions. Call this the intelligence puzzle of habits. This puzzle invites three standard replies. Some stipulate that habits lack intelligence and contend that the puzzle is ill-posed. Others hold that habitual actions can exhibit intelligence because they are guided by automatic yet rational, propositional processes. Others still suggest that habits guide intelligent behaviour without involving propositional states by shaping perception in action-soliciting ways. We develop an alternative fourth answer based on John Dewey's pragmatist account of habit. We argue that habits promote intelligent behaviour by shaping perception, by forming an interrelated network among themselves, and by cooperating with the environment. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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