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R&D incentives and competitive pressure under hidden information.

Within a principal‐agent model, the paper studies how hidden information affects incentives to invest in demand‐enhancing R&D of a firm competing in the product market. The analysis shows that, when the R&D outcome is private information of the innovating firm not only compared to its competitor, bu...

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Publicado en:Southern Economic Journal Vol. 88; no. 1; pp. 56 - 79
Autor principal: Romano, Maria G.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Jul2021
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: R&D incentives and competitive pressure under hidden information.
      aug:
        au: Romano, Maria G.
        affil: University of Salerno and CSEF, Fisciano, Italy
      su: Economic competition
      sug:
        subj: Economic competition
      keyword:
        hidden information
        product market competition
        R&D
        hidden information
        product market competition
        R&D
      ab: Within a principal‐agent model, the paper studies how hidden information affects incentives to invest in demand‐enhancing R&D of a firm competing in the product market. The analysis shows that, when the R&D outcome is private information of the innovating firm not only compared to its competitor, but also relative to its supplier, a contractual cost arises which neutralizes the standard strategic benefit of R&D and reduces the incentives to invest. Moreover, within this setting, more intense competition always stifles innovation.
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      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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