Are visuomotor representations cognitively penetrable? Biasing action-guiding vision.
Is action-guiding vision cognitively penetrable? More specifically, is the visual processing that guides our goal-directed actions sensitive to semantic information from cognitive states? This paper critically examines a recent family of arguments whose aim is to challenge a widespread and influenti...
| Published in: | Synthese Vol. 198; pp. 4163 - 4182 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Springer Nature
Jul2021 Supplement 17
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=151438192&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 151438192 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2021 Supplement 17 vid: 198 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 151438192 10.1007/s11229-018-1854-0 ppf: 4163 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 507KB tig: atl: Are visuomotor representations cognitively penetrable? Biasing action-guiding vision. aug: au: Toribio, Josefa affil: ICREA, Pg. Lluís Companys 23, 08010, Barcelona, Spain Department of Philosophy, Universitat de Barcelona, Montalegre 6, 08001, Barcelona, Spain su: Action theory (Psychology) Cognitive science Philosophy of science Cognition sug: subj: Action theory (Psychology) Cognitive science Philosophy of science Cognition keyword: Action-guiding vision Bias Cognitive penetrability Determination Visuomotor representations ab: Is action-guiding vision cognitively penetrable? More specifically, is the visual processing that guides our goal-directed actions sensitive to semantic information from cognitive states? This paper critically examines a recent family of arguments whose aim is to challenge a widespread and influential view in philosophy and cognitive science: the view that action-guiding vision is cognitively impenetrable. I argue, in response, that while there may very well be top–down causal influences on action-guiding vision, they should not be taken to be an instance of cognitive penetration. Assuming otherwise is to assign a computational role to the influencing states that they cannot perform. Although questions about cognitive penetrability are ultimately empirical, the issues addressed in this paper are largely philosophical. The discussion here highlights an important set of considerations that help better understand the relations between cognition, vision, and action. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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