The two visual systems hypothesis and contrastive underdetermination.
This paper concerns local yet systematic problems of contrastive underdetermination of model choice in cognitive neuroscience debates about the so-called two visual systems hypothesis. The underdetermination problem is systematically generated by the way certain assumptions about the representationa...
| Published in: | Synthese Vol. 198; pp. 4045 - 4069 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Springer Nature
Jul2021 Supplement 17
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=151438198&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 151438198 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2021 Supplement 17 vid: 198 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 151438198 10.1007/s11229-018-01984-y ppf: 4045 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 542KB tig: atl: The two visual systems hypothesis and contrastive underdetermination. aug: au: Grünbaum, Thor affil: Philosophy Section, Department of Media, Cognition and Communication, University of Copenhagen, Karen Blixens Plads 8, 2300, Copenhagen S, Denmark su: Philosophy of science Hypothesis Diagnosis Sensory perception Cognitive neuroscience sug: subj: Philosophy of science Hypothesis Diagnosis Sensory perception Cognitive neuroscience keyword: Confirmation theory Contrastive underdetermination Experimental methodology Model choice Philosophy of cognitive science Scientific realism Two visual systems hypothesis ab: This paper concerns local yet systematic problems of contrastive underdetermination of model choice in cognitive neuroscience debates about the so-called two visual systems hypothesis. The underdetermination problem is systematically generated by the way certain assumptions about the representationalist nature of computation are translated into experimental practice. The problem is that behavioural data underdetermine the choice between competing representational models. In this paper, I diagnose how these assumptions generate underdetermination problems in the choice between competing functional models of perception–action. Using the tools of philosophy of science, I describe the type of underdetermination and sketch a possible cure. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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