Intensional biases in affordance perception: an explanatory issue for radical enactivism.
Radical Enactivism holds that the best explanation of basic forms of cognition is provided without involving information of any sort. According to this view, the ability to perceive visual affordances should be accounted for in terms of extensional covariations between variables spanning the agent's...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 198; pp. 4183 - 4204 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jul2021 Supplement 17
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=151438199&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 151438199 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2021 Supplement 17 vid: 198 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 151438199 10.1007/s11229-018-02049-w ppf: 4183 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 582KB tig: atl: Intensional biases in affordance perception: an explanatory issue for radical enactivism. aug: au: Zipoli Caiani, Silvano affil: Università degli Studi di Firenze, Firenze, Italy su: Cognition Visual perception sug: subj: Cognition Visual perception keyword: Basic cognition Intensionality Radical enactivism Visual affordance ab: Radical Enactivism holds that the best explanation of basic forms of cognition is provided without involving information of any sort. According to this view, the ability to perceive visual affordances should be accounted for in terms of extensional covariations between variables spanning the agent's body and the environment. Contrary to Radical Enactivism, I argue that the intensional properties of cognition cannot be ignored, and that the way in which an agent represents the world has consequences on the explanation of basic sensorimotor abilities. To support this claim, I show that the perception of visual affordances is not segregated from higher forms of cognition; rather, it is modulated by the agent's ability to recognize the semantic identity of the visual target. Accordingly, since the semantic recognition of an object involves a way of representing it under a certain description, it can be inferred that the perception of visual affordances cannot be accounted for without considering the intensional properties of cognition. This poses an explanatory issue for Radical Enactivism. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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