Explanatory Consolidation: From 'Best' to 'Good Enough'.
In science and everyday life, we often infer that something is true because it would explain some set of facts better than any other hypothesis we can think of. But what if we have reason to believe that there is a better way to explain these facts that we just haven't thought of? Wouldn't that unde...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 103; no. 1; pp. 157 - 178 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jul2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=151570530&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 151570530 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318205 PPO jtl: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research issn: 00318205 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jul2021 vid: 103 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 151570530 10.1111/phpr.12706 ppf: 157 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1000KB tig: atl: Explanatory Consolidation: From 'Best' to 'Good Enough'. aug: au: Dellsén, Finnur affil: University of Iceland, Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences su: Hypothesis Philosophers Reason Plausibility (Logic) Everyday life sug: subj: Hypothesis Philosophers Reason Plausibility (Logic) Everyday life ab: In science and everyday life, we often infer that something is true because it would explain some set of facts better than any other hypothesis we can think of. But what if we have reason to believe that there is a better way to explain these facts that we just haven't thought of? Wouldn't that undermine our warrant for believing the best available explanation? Many philosophers have assumed that we can solve such underconsideration problems by stipulating that a hypothesis should not only be 'the best' explanation available; rather, it should also be 'good enough'. Unfortunately, however, the only current suggestion for what it might mean to say that an explanation is 'good enough' is, well, not good enough. This paper aims to provide a better account of what is required for an explanatory hypothesis to be considered 'good enough'. In brief, the account holds that a 'good enough' hypothesis is one that has gone through a process that I call explanatory consolidation, in which accumulating evidence and failed attempts to formulate better alternatives gradually make it more plausible that the explanation we currently have is better than any other that could be formulated. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy & Phenomenological Research is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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