Optimal Auctions Through Deep Learning.

Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenue is an intricate task. The single-item case was resolved in a seminal piece of work by Myerson in 1981. Even after 30-40 years of intense research, the problem remains unsolved for settings with two or more items. We overview r...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Communications of the ACM Vol. 64; no. 8; pp. 109 - 117
Autores principales: Dütting, Paul, Zhe Feng, Narasimhan, Harikrishna, Parkes, David C., Ravindranath, Sai S.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Association for Computing Machinery Aug2021
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
Descripción
Sumario:Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenue is an intricate task. The single-item case was resolved in a seminal piece of work by Myerson in 1981. Even after 30-40 years of intense research, the problem remains unsolved for settings with two or more items. We overview recent research results that show how tools from deep learning are shaping up to become a powerful tool for the automated design of near-optimal auctions auctions. In this approach, an auction is modeled as a multilayer neural network, with optimal auction design framed as a constrained learning problem that can be addressed with standard machine learning pipelines. Through this approach, it is possible to recover to a high degree of accuracy essentially all known analytically derived solutions for multi-item settings and obtain novel mechanisms for settings in which the optimal mechanism is unknown.