Too much of a good thing: decision-making in cases with infinitely many utility contributions.
Theories that use expected utility maximization to evaluate acts have difficulty handling cases with infinitely many utility contributions. In this paper I present and motivate a way of modifying such theories to deal with these cases, employing what I call "Direct Difference Taking". This proposal...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 198; no. 8; pp. 7309 - 7350 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Aug2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=151648025&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 151648025 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Aug2021 vid: 198 iid: 8 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 151648025 10.1007/s11229-019-02522-0 ppf: 7309 ppct: 41 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 972KB tig: atl: Too much of a good thing: decision-making in cases with infinitely many utility contributions. aug: au: Meacham, Christopher J. G. affil: E305 South College, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 01003-9274, Amherst, MA, USA su: Decision making Intuition Motivation (Psychology) Social dominance sug: subj: Decision making Intuition Motivation (Psychology) Social dominance ab: Theories that use expected utility maximization to evaluate acts have difficulty handling cases with infinitely many utility contributions. In this paper I present and motivate a way of modifying such theories to deal with these cases, employing what I call "Direct Difference Taking". This proposal has a number of desirable features: it's natural and well-motivated, it satisfies natural dominance intuitions, and it yields plausible prescriptions in a wide range of cases. I then compare my account to the most plausible alternative, a proposal offered by Arntzenius (Philos Perspect 28(1):31–58, 2014). I argue that while Arntzenius's proposal has many attractive features, it runs into a number of problems which Direct Difference Taking avoids. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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