Corporate Liability Design for Human Rights Abuses: Individual and Entity Liability for Due Diligence.
In this article, I critically review the economic theory of corporate liability design, focusing on the allocation of liability between a corporation and its individual human agents. I apply this theory to transnational commercial contexts where human rights abuses occur and assess the likely effica...
| Publicado en: | Oxford Journal of Legal Studies Vol. 41; no. 2; pp. 289 - 321 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Summer2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=151688453&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 151688453 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01436503 BJ4 jtl: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies issn: 01436503 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Summer2021 vid: 41 iid: 2 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 151688453 10.1093/ojls/gqaa052 ppf: 289 ppct: 32 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 303KB tig: atl: Corporate Liability Design for Human Rights Abuses: Individual and Entity Liability for Due Diligence. aug: au: Friedman, Nick affil: Fellow and College Associate Lecturer in Public Law at St John's College, University of Cambridge and Affiliated Lecturer, Cambridge Law Faculty su: Social responsibility of business Human rights Civil rights Supply chain management Constitutional law sug: subj: Social responsibility of business Human rights Civil rights Supply chain management Constitutional law ab: In this article, I critically review the economic theory of corporate liability design, focusing on the allocation of liability between a corporation and its individual human agents. I apply this theory to transnational commercial contexts where human rights abuses occur and assess the likely efficacy of some putative liability regimes, including regimes requiring corporations to undertake human rights due diligence throughout their global supply chains. I advance a set of general considerations justifying the efficacy of due diligence in relation to alternative liability regimes. I argue, however, that due diligence regimes will likely under-deter severe human rights abuses unless they are supported by substantial entity-level sanctions and, in at least some cases, by supplementary liability for individual executives. The analysis has significant policy implications for current national and international efforts to enforce human rights norms against corporations. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Oxford University Press. item: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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