Enactivism, other minds, and mental disorders.
Although enactive approaches to cognition vary in terms of their character and scope, all endorse several core claims. The first is that cognition is tied to action. The second is that cognition is composed of more than just in-the-head processes; cognitive activities are (at least partially) extern...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 198; pp. 365 - 390 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jan2021 Supplement 1
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=151879558&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 151879558 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2021 Supplement 1 vid: 198 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 151879558 10.1007/s11229-019-02133-9 ppf: 365 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 801KB tig: atl: Enactivism, other minds, and mental disorders. aug: au: Krueger, Joel affil: Sociology, Philosophy, and Anthropology, University of Exeter, Amory, Rennes Drive, EX4 4RJ, Exeter, UK su: Mental illness Social perception Personality disorders Cognition Psychologists Autistic children sug: subj: Mental illness Social perception Personality disorders Cognition Psychologists Autistic children keyword: Autism Direct social perception Embodiment Enactivism Forms of vitality Schizophrenia ab: Although enactive approaches to cognition vary in terms of their character and scope, all endorse several core claims. The first is that cognition is tied to action. The second is that cognition is composed of more than just in-the-head processes; cognitive activities are (at least partially) externalized via features of our embodiment and in our ecological dealings with the people and things around us. I appeal to these two enactive claims to consider a view called "direct social perception" (DSP): the idea that we can sometimes perceive features of other minds directly in the character of their embodiment and environmental interactions. I argue that if DSP is true, we can probably also perceive certain features of mental disorders as well. I draw upon the developmental psychologist Daniel Stern's notion of "forms of vitality"—largely overlooked in these debates—to develop this idea, and I use autism as a case study. I argue further that an enactive approach to DSP can clarify some ways we play a regulative role in shaping the temporal and phenomenal character of the disorder in question, and it may therefore have practical significance for both the clinical and therapeutic encounter. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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