Against Radical Enactivism's narrowmindedness about phenomenality.
Radical Enactivism rejects representationalism but nonetheless allows the phenomenal character of perceptual experience as supervening on brain bound elements. In this paper, I argue that Radical Enactivism should reject the possibility of wholly brain-bound phenomenal experience. I propose a way of...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 198; pp. 213 - 229 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jan2021 Supplement 1
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=151879564&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 151879564 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2021 Supplement 1 vid: 198 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 151879564 10.1007/s11229-019-02261-2 ppf: 213 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 264KB tig: atl: Against Radical Enactivism's narrowmindedness about phenomenality. aug: au: Espejo-Serna, Juan Camilo affil: Facultad de Filosofía y Ciencias Humanas, Universidad de La Sabana, Campus Universitario del Puente del Común, Km 7 Autopista Norte de Bogotá, Chía, Cundinamarca, Colombia su: Possibility sug: subj: Possibility keyword: Enactivism Experience Phenomenal character Representationalism ab: Radical Enactivism rejects representationalism but nonetheless allows the phenomenal character of perceptual experience as supervening on brain bound elements. In this paper, I argue that Radical Enactivism should reject the possibility of wholly brain-bound phenomenal experience. I propose a way of individuating perceptual experiences that does not depend on representationalism and raises a problem to the view defended by Hutto and Myin (Radicalizing Enactivism: basic minds without content. MIT Press, Cambridge, 2012) according to which, with respect to phenomenality, it is possible to adopt a view that partly construes experience in terms of engagement with the environment. I argue that Radical Enactivism should change: either deny that the environment plays any role in an account of the phenomenal character or embrace the view that the phenomenal properties of experiences are at least partly constituted by the environment itself. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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