Predictive processing and foundationalism about perception.
Predictive processing accounts of perception (PP) assume that perception does not work in a purely bottom-up fashion but also uses acquired knowledge to make top-down predictions about the incoming sensory signals. This provides a challenge for foundationalist accounts of perception according to whi...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 198; no. 7; pp. 1751 - 1770 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Apr2021 Supplement 7
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=151879585&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 151879585 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2021 Supplement 7 vid: 198 iid: 7 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 151879585 10.1007/s11229-018-1715-x ppf: 1751 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 496KB tig: atl: Predictive processing and foundationalism about perception. aug: au: Ghijsen, Harmen affil: Faculty of Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies, Radboud University, PO Box 9103, Erasmusplein 1, 6500 HD, Nijmegen, The Netherlands su: Dogmatism Forecasting sug: subj: Dogmatism Forecasting keyword: Epistemic downgrade Foundationalism Inferentialist reliabilism Justification Predictive processing ab: Predictive processing accounts of perception (PP) assume that perception does not work in a purely bottom-up fashion but also uses acquired knowledge to make top-down predictions about the incoming sensory signals. This provides a challenge for foundationalist accounts of perception according to which perceptual beliefs are epistemically basic, that is, epistemically independent from other beliefs. If prior beliefs rationally influence which perceptual beliefs we come to accept, then foundationalism about perception appears untenable. I review several ways in which foundationalism might be reconciled with PP from both an internalist and externalist perspective, and argue that an externalist foundationalism provides the best match with PP. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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