Subject-specific intellectualism: re-examining know how and ability.

Intellectualists claim that knowing how to do something is a matter of knowing, for some w, that w is a way to do that thing. However, standard accounts fail to account for the way that knowing how sometimes seems to require ability (although at other times does not). I argue that the way to make se...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 198; no. 7; pp. 1619 - 1639
Autor principal: Wallbridge, Kevin
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Apr2021 Supplement 7
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=151879595&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 151879595
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00397857
        4LI
      jtl: Synthese
      issn: 00397857
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Apr2021 Supplement 7
      vid: 198
      iid: 7
      pid: 237
      pub: Springer Nature
    artinfo:
      ui:
        151879595
        10.1007/s11229-018-01944-6
      ppf: 1619
      ppct: 20
      formats:
        fmt:
          – @attributes:
              type: T
          – @attributes:
              type: P
              size: 504KB
      tig:
        atl: Subject-specific intellectualism: re-examining know how and ability.
      aug:
        au: Wallbridge, Kevin
        affil:
          University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
          Southampton, UK
      su:
        Accounting standards
        Ability
      sug:
        subj:
          Accounting standards
          Ability
      keyword:
        Ability account
        Contextualism
        Intellectualism
        Know how
        Knowledge-how
        Practical knowledge
        Subject-specific
      ab: Intellectualists claim that knowing how to do something is a matter of knowing, for some w, that w is a way to do that thing. However, standard accounts fail to account for the way that knowing how sometimes seems to require ability (although at other times does not). I argue that the way to make sense of this situation is via a 'subject-specific' intellectualism according to which knowing how to do something is a matter of knowing that w is a way for some relevant person to do that thing, but who the relevant person is can change from context to context. If it is the utterer themselves, then knowing how will require ability, but otherwise it will not.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved.
      item: Synthese
      holder: Springer Nature
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2021
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N