Cognitive bias, situationism, and virtue reliabilism.
Mark Alfano claims that the heuristics and biases literature supports inferential cognitive situationism, i.e., the view that most of our inferential beliefs are arrived at and retained by means of unreliable heuristics rather than intellectual virtues. If true, this would present virtue reliabilist...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 198; no. 1; pp. 471 - 491 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Jan2021
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=151915711&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 151915711 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2021 vid: 198 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 151915711 10.1007/s11229-018-02031-6 ppf: 471 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 413KB tig: atl: Cognitive bias, situationism, and virtue reliabilism. aug: au: Bland, Steven affil: Department of Philosophy, Huron University College, 1349 Western Road, London, ON, Canada su: Cognitive bias Virtue Virtues Psychological research Virtue epistemology sug: subj: Cognitive bias Virtue Virtues Psychological research Virtue epistemology keyword: Epistemic situationism Skepticism ab: Mark Alfano claims that the heuristics and biases literature supports inferential cognitive situationism, i.e., the view that most of our inferential beliefs are arrived at and retained by means of unreliable heuristics rather than intellectual virtues. If true, this would present virtue reliabilists with an unpleasant choice: they can either accept inferential skepticism, or modify or abandon reliabilism. Alfano thinks that the latter course of action is most plausible, and several reliabilists seem to agree. I argue that this is not the case. If situationism is true, then inferential non-skepticism is no more plausible than reliabilism. But inferential cognitive situationism is false. The heuristic-based inferences that facilitate successful perception and communication have proven remarkably accurate, and even the psychological research on inductive reasoning does not support Alfano's situationism. More generally, negative assessments of human reasoning tend to ignore the fact that the research on cognitive biases focuses primarily on the performance of individuals in isolation. Several studies suggest that we reason much more effectively when in critical dialogue with others, which highlights the fact that our epistemic performance depends not only on the inner workings of our cognitive processes, but on the environments in which they operate. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|