Rationality as the rule of reason.
This paper explores the prospects of a non‐structuralist account of rationality that doesn't postulate primitive structural requirements (whether of wide or narrow scope) for combinations of attitudes. Instead, it takes competent perceptions of reasons for attitudes to be basic. While broadly simila...
| Publicado en: | Nous (0029-4624) Vol. 55; no. 3; pp. 538 - 560 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Sep2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=151932210&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 151932210 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00294624 D97 jtl: Nous (0029-4624) issn: 00294624 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Sep2021 vid: 55 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 151932210 10.1111/nous.12311 ppf: 538 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 193KB tig: atl: Rationality as the rule of reason. aug: su: Reason Performance Attitude (Psychology) Axioms Intention sug: subj: Reason Performance Attitude (Psychology) Axioms Intention keyword: normativity rationality reason reasons virtue ab: This paper explores the prospects of a non‐structuralist account of rationality that doesn't postulate primitive structural requirements (whether of wide or narrow scope) for combinations of attitudes. Instead, it takes competent perceptions of reasons for attitudes to be basic. While broadly similar proposals have been offered before by Thomas Scanlon and Niko Kolodny, this paper adds two important elements to the picture. First, it argues that perceptions of reasons are implicit in intentions and at least certain beliefs (Normative Constitutivism). This allows for addressing challenges raised by John Broome, and makes it possible to derive norms for structural rationality in a natural way. Second, to avoid bootstrapping issues and to capture the authority of rationality, the paper argues that only competent perceptions of reasons give rise to rational requirements and permissions. The relevant kind of competence is a fallible sensitivity to at least basic favoring relations, including the weights of reasons and patterns among them. If we use Reason as the label for such competence, to be rational is to be ruled by one's Reason. If this proposal is successful, there is a common source for the diverse manifestations of rationality and irrationality. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Nous (0029-4624) is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Nous (0029-4624) holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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