Networks, Property, and the Division of Labor.
We use a simulation-based method to consider the effect of different network structures on the propensity for economic producers to develop a complementary division of labor. We use a graph-coloring game, in which nodes are given incentives to find a color that does not match their nearest neighbors...
| Publicado en: | American Sociological Review Vol. 86; no. 4; pp. 759 - 787 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Sage Publications Inc.
Aug2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=151959525&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 151959525 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00031224 ASC jtl: American Sociological Review issn: 00031224 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Aug2021 vid: 86 iid: 4 pid: 344 pub: Sage Publications Inc. artinfo: ui: 151959525 10.1177/00031224211027893 ppf: 759 ppct: 28 formats: tig: atl: Networks, Property, and the Division of Labor. aug: au: Erikson, Emily Shirado, Hirokazu affil: Yale University Carnegie Mellon University su: Division of labor Property Task performance Employment Organizational effectiveness Artificial neural networks sug: subj: Division of labor Property Task performance Employment Organizational effectiveness Artificial neural networks keyword: computational models markets network science social coordination theory computational models markets network science social coordination theory ab: We use a simulation-based method to consider the effect of different network structures on the propensity for economic producers to develop a complementary division of labor. We use a graph-coloring game, in which nodes are given incentives to find a color that does not match their nearest neighbors, to represent the interdependent coordination problems inherent to the division of labor. We find that a decentralized development of a division of labor is difficult, particularly when too many specializations are chosen. Counterintuitively, a division of labor is more likely to evolve when the ability of agents to specialize is more constrained. The ability to store property also facilitates the development of a division of labor. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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